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NOTES 
DELAWARE TO THE RESCUE: A PROPER 
EXERCISE OF DEFERENCE BY THE SEC AND 
THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF CA, INC. V. 
AFSCME 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the emergence of the modern corporation, some 
shareholders, known as shareholder activists, have tried to gather more 
power in the day-to-day management of the firm.1 Typically, the 
corporation is managed by a group known as the board of directors, with 
minimal interference from shareholders.2 However, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) allows shareholders a chance to influence the 
corporation via shareholder proposals, which are proposals made by 
shareholders that are “placed alongside management’s proposals in that 
company’s proxy [voting] materials for presentation to a vote at an annual 
or special meeting.”3 Nevertheless, upon the request of the corporation 
receiving the proposal, the SEC may exclude such a proposal if it violates 
“certain procedural requirements or the proposal falls within one of the 
Rule 14a-8’s [thirteen] substantive grounds for exclusion.”4
Usually, the SEC decides whether the proposal violates any of the 
provisions without help from any outside source.
 
5 However, that all 
changed in July 2008 when the SEC certified a request for exclusion made 
by a corporation to the Delaware Supreme Court pursuant to a new power 
the court was granted by the Delaware legislature.6
                                                                                                                 
 1. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATION AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 154–55 
(9th ed. 2005) (stating that in 1932, Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means gave rise to the 
modern corporation when their influential paper, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
argued that ownership and control in a corporation should be separate from one another. The work 
is widely adopted today). 
 2. Id. at 106. 
 3. Id. at 304–05 (quoting SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14A (2002)). Details about how 
shareholder proposals work, and the company’s ability to exclude them under Rule 14a-8 of the 
federal proxy rules, are discussed in Part II. 
 4. Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce: Shareholder Rights, the 2008 Proxy Season, and the Impact of Shareholder 
Activism (July 22, 2008). 
 5. Id. 
 6. The ability for the SEC to certify to the Delaware Supreme Court is codified in Del. Const. 
art. IV, § 11(8). The author worked at the SEC, in the Chief Counsel’s office for the Division of 
Corporation Finance, during the period in which the questions of law presented in the CA, Inc. no-
action request were certified and decided by the Delaware Supreme Court. 
 The case, CA, Inc. v. 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Pension 
Plan (AFSCME), was accepted for adjudication by the Delaware Supreme 
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Court and decided two weeks later in a landmark opinion.7 Relying on the 
court’s opinion, the SEC excluded the proposal and thus, for the first time 
in its history, decided an issue that arose under the federal proxy rules by 
directly relying on the decision of a state court.8
The court’s decision in CA, Inc. has raised eyebrows for two reasons. 
First, federalism questions have emerged regarding the SEC’s ability to 
certify questions of law to outside jurisdictions in order to help it make 
decisions under federal securities laws. Second, the court’s decision is 
important because it affects Delaware law. Since CA, Inc. was a Delaware 
decision, the case is likely to influence the corporate law jurisprudence of 
other states.
 
9 CA, Inc. will also affect a majority of publicly traded 
corporations since Delaware is their choice for incorporation.10 Thus, this 
note will have a dual purpose: (1) to analyze the federalism aspects of the 
SEC’s decision to certify two questions of law to the Delaware Supreme 
Court and (2) to determine what impact the CA, Inc. case will have on 
Delaware’s (and presumably other states’) corporate law jurisprudence as it 
relates to the ability of shareholders to affect a corporation via the bylaw 
amendment process. Part II of this note describes the SEC’s role under Rule 
14a-8 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (‘34 Act).11 Part III describes 
the power of the SEC to certify questions of law to the Delaware Supreme 
Court. Part IV of this note explores the facts and background of the CA, Inc. 
case including the actual shareholder proposal submitted by AFSCME, 
briefly discusses the decision and rationale of the Delaware Supreme Court 
and introduces what the case stood for, both from a federalism perspective 
and for Delaware Corporation Law. Part V focuses on why the SEC was 
criticized for certifying this federal proxy rule case to the Delaware 
Supreme Court, and responds to the criticisms specifically advanced by 
Professor J. Robert Brown, a corporate law scholar.12
                                                                                                                 
 7. See CA, Inc. v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 
227 (Del. 2008). The opinion and its future implications are discussed infra in Part VI. 
 8. See CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 516 at *1, discussed infra 
in Part IV. 
 9. See Delaware Supreme Court to SEC: Bring It On, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/21/delaware-supreme-court-to-sec-bring-it-on/ (May 21, 2007, 
15:32 EST) (stating that the Delaware Supreme Court is influential). 
 10. More than 50% of all publicly-traded companies in the United States, including 63% of the 
Fortune 500, have chosen Delaware as their legal home. Delaware Dept. of St.: Div. of Corp., 
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
 11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008). 
 12. Professor Brown is a Corporate Governance and Business Law Professor at the University 
of Denver, Sturm College of Law. See Professor Jay Brown, 
http://law.du.edu/index.php/profile/jay-brown. 
 The section concludes 
with this author’s defense of the SEC’s actions, and a suggestion for how 
all states can improve their corporate law. Part VI of this note discusses the 
affects of the CA, Inc. case on Delaware corporate law and reviews the 
reactions of scholars and commentators to the decision. In addition, it 
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explains why the case is a significant loss for shareholders outside of 
election related bylaw amendments. 
II. RULE 14A-8 OF THE EXCHANGE ACT 
The ‘34 Act was created because “transactions in securities as 
commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter 
markets [involve a] national public interest . . . [making it necessary to] 
provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and 
matters related thereto . . . to insure the maintenance of fair and honest 
markets in such transactions.”13 Rule 14a-8 of the ‘34 Act allows for 
shareholders who meet certain guidelines to submit proposals to companies 
in which they hold shares.14 However, Rule 14a-8 also allows companies to 
exclude such proposals under various grounds.15 Thus, if a shareholder 
submits a proposal to a company, the company is allowed to exclude the 
proposal from its annual meeting if it believes the ‘34 Act allows for it. 
However, in order to exclude the proposal, the company must file a “no-
action” request with the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance16 (Staff), 
asking them to “concur in the company’s view” that the proposal is 
excludable under Rule 14a-8 of the ‘34 Act.17 Although the Staff’s decision 
is not binding,18 companies rarely, if ever, go against what the Staff says for 
fear of enforcement action against them by the SEC.19
                                                                                                                 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2006). Other goals of the ‘34 Act were to govern “transactions by 
officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require appropriate reports to remove 
impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for securities and a 
national system for the clearance and settlement of securities transactions and the safeguarding of 
securities and funds related thereto, and to impose requirements necessary to make such regulation 
and control reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect interstate commerce, the 
national credit, the [f]ederal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national 
banking system and Federal Reserve System.” 15 U.S.C. § 78(b). 
 14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2008) (“[I]n order to be eligible to submit a proposal, 
[shareholders] must have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the 
company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by 
the date you submit the proposal. [Shareholders] must continue to hold those securities through 
the date of the meeting.”). 
 15. There are two types of exclusions that a company can use in order to invalidate a 
shareholder proposal: procedural and substantive. Procedural exclusions are located in 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-8(b)-(e). Substantive exclusions are located in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1)–(i)(13). 
 16. The Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC has the power to interpret and decide 
questions under Rule 14a-8. See SEC.gov, No-Action Letters, http://sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-
noaction/14a-8.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2009). 
 17. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14 (2001), available at 
http://sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14.htm. 
 18. See id. (“[T]he no-action responses only reflect our [the Staff’s] informal views regarding 
the application of Rule 14a-8. We do not claim to issue ‘rulings’ or ‘decisions’ on proposals that 
companies indicate they intend to exclude, and our determinations do not and cannot adjudicate 
the merits of a company’s position with respect to a proposal”). 
 
 19. See Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, CooleyAlert! Shareholder Proposals: What You Need 
to Know Now, 1, 1 (2004), http://www.cooley.com/files/tbl_s24News/PDFUpload152/780/ 
ALERT_Shareholder_Proposal.pdf (stating that “the company may not exclude the proposal 
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Under Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2), the SEC has the power to grant no-
action relief to a company if the shareholder’s proposal is “not a proper 
subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the 
company’s organization”20 or, “if implemented, [would] cause the company 
to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject.”21 
Essentially, Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) ask the SEC to interpret the law of 
the company’s state of incorporation and decide whether the state’s 
corporate law would allow for the exclusion of such proposal.22 
Traditionally, the SEC’s role under Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) was similar 
to that of a federal court applying state law in a diversity jurisdiction case, 
with one key difference: the lack of power to certify questions of law to the 
relevant state court for interpretation and decision.23
III. THE SEC’S CERTIFICATION ABILITY 
 
In 2007, the SEC received the power to certify questions of law to a 
state court when Delaware, wanting the SEC to “advance a direct 
interpretation of Delaware law,”24 amended its state constitution to allow 
the SEC to certify questions of law directly to the Delaware Supreme 
Court.25
                                                                                                                 
unless it has received a response from the SEC indicating that it will not take any enforcement 
action against the company if the shareholder proposal is omitted.”). However, it should be noted 
that all parties to a no-action request have the ability to appeal the Staff’s decision to the Federal 
District Court. 
 20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2008). 
 21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(2). 
 22. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) & (i)(2). 
 23. In a case brought on diversity jurisdiction grounds, federal courts generally apply the law 
the state court in the state of the diversity filing would have applied. See generally Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This is similar to the SEC which applies the law of the state 
in which the company is incorporated (i.e. if the company is incorporated in New York, then the 
SEC will apply the corporate law the New York state courts would have applied). However, 
unlike the SEC in non-Delaware cases, federal judges may go “straight to those responsible for 
declaring state law [and] certify novel questions of state law directly to the state’s highest court.” 
Wendy L. Watson, Mckinzie Craig & Daniel Orion Davis, Federal Court Certification of State-
Law Questions: Active Judicial Federalism, JUST. SYS. J. 1, 1 (2007), available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4043/is_200701/ai_n18755748?tag=untagged. 
 24. Delaware Supreme Court to SEC: Bring It On, supra note 9. 
 25. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8) (“The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction . . . [t]o hear and 
determine questions of law certified to it by . . . the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission.”). 
 The Delaware certification provision allows the SEC to ask the 
Delaware Supreme Court any questions about Delaware state law. This is 
helpful for the SEC in situations where its decision requires an application 
of Delaware state law. While some hailed the move as potentially “the most 
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important development in Delaware corporate law,”26 others were far less 
enthused about the possibility of federal deference to a state court.27
Following the constitutional amendment, AFSCME introduced a 
proposal
 
28 to CA, Inc. (CA) for inclusion in its 2008 Annual Meeting of 
Shareholders.29 CA, pursuant to Rules 14a-8(i)(1), (i)(2), (i)(3),30 and 
(i)(8),31 asked the Staff to concur in their judgment that the proposal was 
excludable.32 While the Staff refused to exclude the proposal under (i)(3) 
and (i)(8),33 it was unsure whether CA met its burden under (i)(1) and (i)(2) 
to exclude AFSCME’s proposal.34 Since CA was a company incorporated 
in Delaware,35 the SEC decided to certify two questions of law concerning 
CA’s no-action request to the Delaware Supreme Court using the new 
power granted to it approximately one-year prior.36 The Delaware Supreme 
Court accepted certification37 and decided the case in sixteen days,38 
ultimately concluding that the proposal was illegal under Delaware state 
law.39 Consequently, “having the guidance of the Delaware decision, the 
SEC staff notified CA on July 17, 2008, that the proposal could be excluded 
on the basis of Rule 14a-8(i)(2).”40
Immediately following the case, the SEC was attacked by scholars who 
believed it was improper for the SEC to decide a federal issue by exercising 
 
                                                                                                                 
 26. SEC to Certify Questions to Delaware Supreme, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2007/05/ 
sec_to_certify_.html/ (May 22, 2007). 
 27. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/the-sec-governance/as-predicted-the-sec-and-the-further-
denial-of-shareholder-a.html (July 1, 2008, 13:00) (calling the SEC’s certification ability “a very 
bad idea for so many reasons.”). 
 28. See CA, Inc., v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 
227, 227 (Del. 2008). 
 29. CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495 at *1. 
 30. Rule 14a-8(i)(3) allows for proposal exclusion if the “proposal or supporting statement is 
contrary to any of the Commission’s proxy rules, including § 240.14a-9, which prohibits 
materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials.” 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(3) 
(2008). 
 31. Rule 14a-8(i)(8) allows for proposal exclusion if the “proposal relates to a nomination or 
an election for membership on the company’s board of directors or analogous governing body or a 
procedure for such nomination or election.” 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8). 
 32. Request of CA, Inc, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at *49. 
 33. Id. at *1. 
 34. Id. at *2. 
 35. This information is available via the SEC IDEA database, http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-
edgar?company= &CIK= CA&filenum=&State=&SIC=&owner=include&action=getcompany. 
 36. 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at *2. 
 37. Order accepting certification from the SEC, CA, Inc., v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & 
Mun. Employees Pension Plan, No. 329, 2008 1, 3 (Del. 2008), available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2008/07/corrected-order.pdf. 
 38. The Delaware Supreme Court accepted certification on July 1, 2008. Id. The case was 
decided on July 17, 2008. See CA, Inc., v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees 
Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 227 (Del. 2008). 
 39. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 227. 
 40. Atkins, supra note 4. 
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deference to a state court.41 However, CA, Inc. should not be looked at 
solely through the prism of federalism philosophy and debate. The actual 
substantive decision of the case is one that has inspired passionate 
arguments from numerous scholars, commentators, law firms and experts 
on the topic, many who disagree as to what exactly the Delaware Supreme 
Court decided. Were all election bylaws therefore good, so long as they 
contained an express fiduciary out clause?42 Could shareholders affect a 
corporation via bylaws for other types of corporate governance issues?43
IV. FACTS AND BACKGROUND OF CA, INC. V. AFSCME 
 
The CA, Inc. decision left these questions open to interpretation. 
On April 18, 2008, CA submitted six copies of its no-action request44
The board of directors shall cause the corporation to reimburse a 
stockholder or group of stockholders (together, the “Nominator”) for 
reasonable expenses (“Expenses”) incurred in connection with nominating 
one or more candidates in a contested election of directors to the 
corporation’s board of directors, including, without limitation, printing, 
mailing, legal, solicitation, travel, advertising and public relations 
expenses, so long as (a) the election of fewer than 50% of the directors to 
be elected is contested in the election, (b) one or more candidates 
nominated by the Nominator are elected to the corporation’s board of 
directors, (c) stockholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for 
 
asking the Staff to exclude a proposal presented to it by AFSCME. The 
relevant part of the proposal reads as follows: 
                                                                                                                 
 41. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27 
(calling the SEC’s certification ability “a bad idea for so many reasons”). 
 42. Professor Brown argues that the case has “dramatically broaden[ed] the types of bylaws 
that now must be excluded under Rule 14a-8.” As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of 
Shareholder Access (The Anticipated Result) (Part 18), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/the-
sec-governance/as-predicted-the-sec-and-the-further-denial-of-shareholder-a-71468.html (July 18, 
2008 06:14). Another blogger maintains that the case is a “huge win” for shareholders inside the 
election process, but “negative for all other types of stockholder-adopted bylaws.” CA v. 
AFSCME: The Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away, 
http://www.deallawyers.com/blog/archives/2008_07.html (July 18, 2008 07:29 EST). However, 
Larry Ribstein argues “the court made it clear that it was not deciding the issue as a matter of 
policy, and left insurgents alternative procedures. Thus, the court was careful to present itself as a 
pragmatic forum that would hear the shareholders out on a case by case basis.” Delaware 
Responds to the Certified Questions, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2008/07/delaware-
respon.html (July 17, 2008 20:19 EST) [hereinafter, Ribstein, Delaware Responds]. See also Barry 
H. Genkin & Keith E. Gottfried, Delaware Supreme Court Holds That A Bylaw Mandating 
Reimbursement Of A Dissident Shareholder’s Proxy Solicitation Expenses Is A Proper Subject 
For Unilateral Shareholder Action But As Proposed Violates Delaware Law, Aug. 28, 2008,  
available at http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=1655 (“[W]hile [the] 
decision can be seen as a significant victory for dissident and activist shareholders, it leaves many 
questions unanswered.”). 
 43. See sources cited supra note 42. 
 44. When a company requests that the Staff concur in its judgment that it may exclude the 
proposal under Rule 14a-8, it must submit six copies of its response pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 14a-
8(j)(2) (2008). 
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directors, and (d) the election occurred, and the Expenses were incurred, 
after [the] bylaw’s adoption. The amount paid to a Nominator under this 
bylaw in respect of a contested election shall not exceed the amount 
expended by the corporation in connection with such election.45
CA asked the Staff to concur in its judgment that the proposal violated 
Rules 14a-8(i)(1), (i)(2), (i)(3) and (i)(8).
 
46 Furthermore, CA furnished a 
legal opinion47 from the law firm Richards, Layton and Finger (RLF), 
stating the proposal, “if adopted, would cause [CA] to violate [s]ection 
141(a) of the [Delaware] General Corporation Law (DGCL).”48 Section 
141(a) of the DGCL requires that the corporation be managed by the board 
of directors, subject to limitations and grants of power stated in the 
certificate of incorporation.49 Since CA’s Certificate of Incorporation 
clearly stated that the management and conduct of the business “shall be 
vested in its Board of Directors,” RLF asserted the “Certificate of 
Incorporation does not contemplate management by the stockholders or 
anyone other than the Board of Directors of the Company.”50 Thus, RLF 
concluded that AFSCME’s proposal could not be legal under the DGCL 
because the “[p]roposed [b]ylaw would require that the Board relinquish its 
power to determine what expenses should and should not be reimbursed to 
stockholders, instead requiring that the Board reimburse all proxy 
solicitation expenses that meet the criteria set forth in the [p]roposed 
[b]ylaw.”51
On May 21, 2008, AFSCME responded to CA’s no-action request by 
submitting a legal opinion of its own to the Staff, explaining why it felt that 
the proposal submitted to CA was legal under the DGCL.
 
52 In support of 
AFSCME’s position, its counsel, Grant & Eisenhofer (G&E), asserted that 
the proposal was legal under the DGCL because “shareholders have the 
power to enact bylaws.”53 Furthermore, G&E argued that language in 
section 109(b) of the DGCL strengthened this argument.54
                                                                                                                 
 45. CA, Inc., v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 
227 (Del. 2008). 
 46. Request of CA, Inc., CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at 
*49. 
 47. Whenever a company tries to exclude a proposal “based on matters of state or foreign law” 
(i.e., under (i)(1) or (i)(2)), “a supporting opinion of counsel” is required. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(j)(2)(iii). 
 48. Request of CA, Inc., 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 495, at *60. 
 49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2008). 
 50. Request of CA, Inc., 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 495, at *76 (quoting art. SEVENTH, § 1 of 
CA, Inc. Certificate of Incorporation). 
 51. Id. at *78. 
 52. See generally Response of AFSCME, 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 495. 
 53. Id. at *23. 
 54. Id. at *23–24. 
 Section 109(b) of 
the DGCL states that “bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent 
with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of 
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the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the 
rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”55 
Therefore, G&E concluded AFSCME’s bylaw was valid since Delaware 
law would allow for “a Corporation to expend corporate funds to reimburse 
successful nominators.”56
After CA provided an answer to AFSCME’s response that reiterated its 
initial arguments, the Staff issued its initial no-action response to the parties 
involved.
 
57 Writing for the Staff, Thomas J. Kim58 concluded that the SEC 
would have to certify questions of law to Delaware to decide the no-action 
request, to determine if the “proposal is a proper subject for action by 
shareholders as a matter of Delaware law, and . . . whether the proposal, if 
adopted, would cause CA to violate any Delaware law to which it is 
subject.”59 Thus, the SEC was going to defer to a state court in order to 
answer a no-action request for the first time ever, via the power granted to it 
by Delaware in 2005.60 By asking whether the “proposal is a proper action 
for shareholders,” the SEC was looking for an answer to Rule 14a-8(i)(1).61 
In addition, in asking “whether the proposal, if adopted, would cause CA to 
violate any Delaware Law,” the SEC was looking for an answer to Rule 
14a-8(i)(2).62 Concluding that “important and urgent reasons” existed for an 
“immediate determination of the questions certified,” the Delaware 
Supreme Court accepted the certified questions on July 1, 2008.63
On July 16, 2008, after briefs were submitted and oral arguments 
conducted,
  
64 Justice Jack B. Jacobs, writing for the court en banc,65 
answered both questions in the affirmative.66
                                                                                                                 
 55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 109(b) (2008). 
 56. Response of AFSCME, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 495, at *26. 
 57. See 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495. 
 58. Thomas J. Kim is the Chief Counsel & Associate Director for the Division of Corporate 
Finance. Id. at *2. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at *1. 
 61. This is what the language of Rule 14a-8(i)(1) mandates. See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(1) 
(2008). 
 62. This is what the language of Rule 14a-8(i)(2) mandates. See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(2). 
 63. Order accepting certification from the SEC, CA, Inc., v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & 
Mun. Employees Pension Plan, No. 329, 2008 1, 3 (Del. 2008), available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2008/07/corrected-order.pdf. 
 64. Briefs were submitted on July 7, 2008. Oral arguments were held on July 9, 2008. Id. 
 65. Typically, the Delaware Supreme Court sits in panels of three Justices. Del. Sup. Ct. R. 
4(c). 
 66. CA, Inc., v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 
237, 240 (Del. 2008). 
 According to the court, the 
proposal was a proper action because corporate expenditures do not 
override the basic, fundamental right of shareholders to “facilitate the 
[ability to participate in selecting contestants to the Board of Directors] by 
proposing a bylaw that would encourage candidates other than 
[management’s] nominees to stand for election. [AFSCME’s proposal] 
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accomplish[es] [this] by committing the corporation to reimburse the 
election expenses of shareholders whose candidates are successfully 
elected.”67
Nevertheless, the court went on to conclude that AFSCME’s bylaw 
provision was illegal because, when looking at the proposal abstractly,
 
68 
AFSCME’s proposal “would violate the prohibition, which our decisions 
have derived from [s]ection 141(a), against contractual arrangements that 
commit the board of directors to a course of action that would preclude 
them from fully discharging their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
shareholders.”69 If this were allowed, a breach of the board of directors’ 
fiduciary duty would ensue.70
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision of “split[ting] the baby”
 
71 
enabled the SEC to finally give a conclusive answer to CA’s request for 
exclusion.72 On the same day the Delaware Supreme Court declared the 
proposal invalid, Mr. Kim wrote to the parties involved and told them that 
due to the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision, CA would be allowed to 
exclude the proposal.73
V. THE REACTION TO THE SEC’S CERTIFICATION 
 Consequently, CA’s no-action request was resolved. 
However, debate on the case had just begun. 
Not all scholars agree that the CA, Inc. case was handled correctly by 
the SEC. For example, Professor J. Robert Brown, an expert on corporate 
law and governance and a teacher at the Sturm College of Law at the 
University of Denver has criticized the SEC’s decision to certify questions 
of law that arise under Rule 14a-8 directly to the Delaware Supreme 
Court.74 However, Professor Brown’s criticism is incorrect. The SEC’s 
decision to certify two questions to the Delaware Supreme Court was a 
proper and necessary exercise of deference to state law under the federal 
proxy rules. Although the SEC has the power to certify questions to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, it did not have to.75
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. at 237. 
 68. The court explained that “[t]he certified questions [before it] request a determination of the 
validity of [AFSCME’s proposal] in the abstract. Therefore, in response to the second question, 
we must necessarily consider any possible circumstance under which a board of directors might be 
required to act.” Id. at 238. 
 69. Id. at 240. 
 70. Id. at 238, 240. 
 71. CA v. AFSCME: The Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh 
Away, supra note 42. 
 72. CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 516, at *1. 
 73. Id. at *1–2. 
 74. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27. 
 75. The SEC is not obligated to certify questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court. The 
SEC’s power is unilateral. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8). 
 The SEC could have refused 
to exclude the proposal and allow the parties to litigate the case in state 
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court if they wanted to.76 Instead, the SEC decided to certify in order to get 
a proper interpretation of Delaware law, enabling the Staff to obtain 
accurate answers to Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2).77
A. RESPONDING TO PROFESSOR BROWN 
 
According to Professor Brown, the SEC’s decision to certify questions 
of law to Delaware is nothing more than an “approach[] designed to renege” 
on a promise to not exclude election-related proposals that have been 
consistently allowed by the Staff.78 Professor Brown argues that the SEC’s 
decision to certify questions of law to Delaware in the CA, Inc. no-action 
request was “unnecessary,”79 ill advised as a “matter of policy,”80 and a 
“back door effort by the staff to restrict other types of proposals designed to 
increase the ability of shareholders to elect directors.”81
First, Professor Brown argues that the SEC should never certify 
questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court because it is 
unnecessary.
 
82 According to Professor Brown, an “alternative mechanism 
exists for testing the legality of [proposals]”83—the Staff can deny the 
company’s request for no-action relief and allow the company to litigate the 
matter in Delaware if it wants to.84 Since the SEC can decide a federal 
issue, while at the same time the parties to the action can take proper 
recourse via the state court system, “no reason” exists to use the 
certification power granted by Delaware to the SEC.85
Although Professor Brown is correct when he states that his “alternative 
mechanism” is a method by which proposals can be presented to the state 
 
                                                                                                                 
 76. This is exactly what Professor Brown says the SEC should have done. See As Predicted: 
The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27. 
 77. See CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at *1–2. 
 78. Responding to a “decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that did not 
defer to the [SEC’s] longstanding interpretation of [Rule 14a-8(i)(8)]”, Shareholder Proposals 
Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56914, 72 Fed. Reg. 70450 
(Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-56914.pdf, the “SEC 
adopted amendments to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) that included extremely broad language” that many 
feared would be used to exclude proposals relating to a director election that prior thereto were 
consistently allowed in. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, 
supra note 27. However, the SEC assured the public that such proposals would continue to be 
allowed. Professor Brown feels that while such proposals will be permitted under an (i)(8) 
analysis, the certification power is just a backhanded way of getting the proposal excluded under 
(i)(1) or (i)(2) by having the Delaware Supreme Court do it for them. Thus, according to Professor 
Brown, the SEC is de facto excluding the proposal and “reneging on their promise.”  As 
Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27. 
 79. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27. 
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courts,86 if such mechanism was adopted when the SEC had the ability to 
certify questions of law directly to the pertinent state court, Rules 14a-
8(i)(1) and (i)(2) would be effectively rendered meaningless. Proposals that 
would unquestionably be excluded under Rule 14a-8 (with the aid of a state 
court’s opinion) would be allowed in. Other requests, such as those that 
touched upon an unsettled state law issue, would automatically be denied 
no-action relief, since the company would be unable to carry the burden 
necessary to exclude a proposal under the federal proxy rules.87 By not 
exercising its certification ability, the SEC would be wasting its ability to 
get a definitive determination from the company’s state of incorporation. 
More importantly, the SEC would not be interpreting Rule 14a-8 under 
Professor Brown’s method in the best way possible because the SEC would 
be denying companies and shareholders alike direct access to the relevant 
state court, the Delaware Supreme Court—the court with the ability to bring 
finality to an unsettled area of Delaware law.88
Professor Brown also asserts that the SEC’s decision to certify 
questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court is ill-advised as a matter of 
policy.
 Although Professor Brown’s 
method is one way of resolving issues like the one presented in the CA, Inc. 
no-action request, the SEC’s certification ability is better. 
89 According to Professor Brown, the “Commission should not be in 
the position of having its interpretation decided by the pro-management 
Delaware courts.”90 Instead, Professor Brown asserts that the SEC, being 
the federal agency in charge of interpreting Rule 14a-8 of the ‘34 Act, 
should only rely on itself for deciding issues arising under Rule 14a-8.91
Although it is true that Delaware effectively decided the Rule 14a-
8(i)(1) and (i)(2) questions in the CA, Inc. no-action request,
 
92
                                                                                                                 
 86. The SEC still uses this method in non-Delaware no-action requests. See Atkins, supra note 
4. 
 87. Professor Brown’s “alternative mechanism” is the proper method to use when the SEC 
does not have the ability to certify questions of law to the company’s state of incorporation. 
However, when the SEC has a process to get a correct state interpretation, that process should be 
used. Whether other states should follow Delaware’s lead and grant the SEC the ability to certify 
questions to its highest court is discussed infra Part V.B. 
 88. The SEC’s job is to determine how a state court would decide the no-action request 
presented to them. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) & (i)(2) (2008). Thus, if the SEC can get an 
answer from the court with the ability to interpret such mandate, an argument can be made that the 
SEC must attempt to receive an answer from that court. 
 89. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See generally id. 
 92. Technically, all Delaware decided was the proposal’s legality under state law. The SEC 
then took that decision and applied it to Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2). However, by deciding the 
state law question, Delaware effectively dictated to the SEC how they should come out on the 
Rule 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) issue. Nevertheless, the focus should not be on whether the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s opinion had the de facto effect of deciding the no-action request, but rather 
whether the SEC’s interpretation of Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) violated principles of federalism. 
It is the position of this Note that it did not, since, by its very nature, Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) 
require deference to other law. 
 the purpose 
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of Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) is for the SEC to defer to state law. It is a 
fact that “[i]nevitably, proxy regulation intrudes to a certain extent on state 
regulation of shareholder voting rights.”93 This is because “corporations are 
creatures of state law and . . . state law remains [the main basis for 
corporate governance rules].”94 Thus, if the SEC decided the issue when an 
alternative method existed by which the SEC could get a direct answer, it 
would be overstepping the “authority that has been clearly delegated to it by 
Congress.”95
In addition, while the CA, Inc. case does raise questions of federalism, 
it does not do so in the usual sense. In the classic federalism case, the 
federal and state government battle over whose laws govern a particular 
area of the law.
 
96 The two sides each believe that their rule is the governing 
one.97 Here, the exact opposite situation is present. Instead of the state 
government and the federal government bickering with each other over 
which law governs, the SEC and Delaware are working in tandem, as 
Delaware is relying on the SEC to certify unsettled questions of law, while 
the SEC is relying on Delaware to render an opinion so the SEC can decide 
the no-action request presented to it.98 Because the SEC had already 
interpreted Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) in the CA, Inc. no-action request to 
mean that further clarification was needed from the Delaware Supreme 
Court to answer the no-action request presented to them,99 the SEC’s 
interpretation of Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) was not decided by the 
Delaware courts. Asking members of the Staff, whose expertise lays outside 
the realm of complex questions of state law,100
                                                                                                                 
 93. ProfessorBainbridge.com, CA v. AFSCME: Should the SEC Have Raised the Question?, 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/ (July 13, 2008), (follow “Archive (Calendar) hyperlink; 
then follow “Previous Year” hyperlink; then follow “July” hyperlink; then follow “CA v. 
AFSCME: Should the SEC Have Raised the Question?” hyperlink) [hereinafter Bainbridge]. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Kala Ladenheim, History of U.S. Federalism, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/courses/ 
scgov/History_of_Federalism.htm (last visited on Mar. 1, 2009). 
 97. For an example of a “classic federalism” case, see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 
(1987) (where South Dakota sued the federal government for imposing a national liquor age law 
that was contrary to South Dakota’s liquor age law). 
 98. This observation is made by synthesizing the grant of certification power given to the SEC 
by the Delaware Legislature, Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(8), the comments of Myron T. Steele, Chief 
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court (stating that the court wanted the SEC to “advance a more 
direct interpretation of Delaware law”), Delaware Supreme Court to SEC: Bring It On, supra note 
9, and the actual certification request by the SEC in the CA, Inc. no-action request. CA, Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at *1–2. 
 99. See 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at *2. 
 100. This is why a legal opinion from a law firm with knowledge of the governing state law is 
required whenever a state law ground (i.e., 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2)) is asserted for a proposal’s 
exclusion. 
 to decide the issue for 
themselves when a process exists whereby they can receive an answer from 
state courts, would go against the mandate of Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2). 
Therefore, the SEC’s certification to Delaware was a correct action. In 
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contrast, it may be Professor Brown’s position that would cause a violation 
of federalism principles to occur, as the SEC would be exercising authority 
in an area of law generally reserved to the states, when an avenue exists by 
which they could receive the necessary answer from the state.101
The SEC’s decision to certify questions of law to Delaware in the CA, 
Inc. case is also supported by Business Roundtable v. SEC.
 
102 In Business 
Roundtable, the SEC adopted a rule barring self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs)103 “from listing the stock of a corporation that takes any corporate 
action ‘with the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing the 
per share voting rights of [existing common stock holders].’”104 In an 
opinion that one scholar refers to as “the most significant evaluation of the 
scope of the SEC’s authority in [the § 14 area to date],”105 the court 
unanimously declared the law invalid because it “directly interfere[d] with 
the substance of what . . . shareholders may enact.”106 The court concluded 
that the primary purposes of § 14 of the ‘34 Act are disclosure and 
enhancement of communication with potential absentee voters.107 
Therefore, if the regulation was allowed, the federalism principle of 
corporations as “creatures of state law”108 would have been “severely 
impinged.”109
The Business Roundtable decision is clear on the authority of the SEC 
under § 14 of the ‘34 Act: the SEC will receive maximum deference when 
it comes to promulgating and interpreting rules that will effect proxy 
communication and disclosure, but will get minimum deference when other 
areas are regulated, especially those that are “within the state’s purview.”
 
110
                                                                                                                 
 101. See As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27 
(stating that the Commission should have the “staff . . . withdraw the request [and] [l]et the 
proposal go forward . . . leav[ing] it to the parties to sort it out in the Delaware courts if they think 
it appropriate.”). 
 102. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). This case was brought to 
my attention by Professor Stephen Bainbridge’s blog posting. See Bainbridge, supra note 93. 
Professor Bainbridge is a Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law. 
 103. Self-regulatory organizations are defined as “non-governmental organization[s] that ha[ve] 
the power to create and enforce industry regulations and standards. The priority is to protect 
investors through the establishment of rules that promote ethics and equality. Some examples of 
SRO’s include stock exchanges [e.g., the New York Stock Exchange], the Investment Dealers 
Association of Canada, and the National Association of Securities Dealers in the United States.” 
Investopedia, Self-Regulatory Organization, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sro.asp (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
 104. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407. 
 105. Bainbridge, supra note 93. It should also be noted that Rules such as 14a-8 are 
promulgated according to their respective section in the ‘34 Act (i.e. § 14 of the ‘34 act is 
enforced by various rules, such as Rule 14a-8 under the Exchange Act.) Accordingly, when § 14 is 
referred to, it covers the same substantive area that Rule 14a-8 is covering as well. 
 106. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411. 
 107. See id. at 410. 
 108. Id. at  412 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 469 (1977)). 
 109. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 412. 
 110. Bainbridge, supra note 93. 
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Thus, it becomes evident that the SEC properly certified questions to the 
Delaware Supreme Court in the CA, Inc. no-action request because 
AFSCME’s proposal touched upon reimbursement of proxy solicitation 
costs, a traditional state law issue.111 Under Business Roundtable, if the 
SEC can get an answer from a state court about an unsettled issue of state 
law, it must attempt to defer to the proper state court, since answering the 
issue on its own would be an exercise of authority not granted to it.112
Professor Brown also argues that the SEC improperly certified 
questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court in the CA, Inc. no-action 
request because, in doing so, the SEC was trying to “restrict . . . proposals 
designed to increase the ability of shareholders to elect directors.”
 
113 He 
asserts that when amendments to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) were made, the type of a 
proposal like the one at issue in CA, Inc. was deemed to be allowed under 
the proxy rules.114 Thus, Professor Brown concludes that if the SEC was 
honest about not excluding shareholder proposals relating to the election of 
directors, it would not allow Delaware the ability to de facto exclude the 
proposal.115
Professor Brown’s sentiments about allowing shareholders increased 
access to proxy ballots is a traditional state law issue because it concerns 
the election of directors.
 
116 Thus, bylaw amendments that affect the election 
of directors are best left to a state court’s interpretation, even if that state 
court may have a bias towards management.117 Furthermore, while 
Professor Brown believes the SEC’s certification to Delaware is nothing 
more than a “backhanded attempt” by it to exclude a shareholder proposal 
concerning an election,118 the SEC decided the issue under Rule 14a-
8(i)(2).119 In fact, the SEC’s refusal to exclude the proposal under Rule 14a-
8(i)(8) in CA, Inc. was consistent with the SEC’s prior statements on the 
subject.120
                                                                                                                 
 111. See id. 
 112. A court may not have to accept the SEC’s attempt for deferral. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 
11(8) (stating that the Delaware Supreme Court has the power to accept questions from the SEC, 
but not that it must accept certification). If such a case were to occur, then Professor Brown’s 
“alternative mechanism” would be acceptable. 
 113. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Of course, the SEC has authority to regulate voting procedure under § 14 of the ‘34 Act. 
However, in my opinion, once the SEC gets into the realm of how the board is nominated or how 
a person or slate of candidates can get onto a proxy ballot, then it is violating principles of 
federalism. See Bainbridge, supra note 93. 
 117. Professor Brown believes that Delaware is a pro-management state. See As Predicted: The 
SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27. 
 118. Id. 
 119. CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 516, at *1–2. 
 The SEC is not in the business of deciding what should be the 
 120. 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at *1. Although it may seem that excluding a proposal that 
was previously approved by the SEC is contradictory at first, it can easily be reconciled. As 
previously mentioned, the SEC in prior statements only stated that they would not exclude 
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best policy, or creating federal corporate law.121 The only job of the SEC 
under Rules 14a-8 (i)(1) and (i)(2) is to find out what the state law on the 
subject is and to apply it accordingly.122
B. OTHER ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE SEC’S CERTIFICATION 
POWER 
 Therefore, the SEC’s decision to 
certify to questions of law in the CA, Inc. case was proper. 
The SEC’s certification ability gives other benefits to all parties 
involved. One such benefit is economic. Under Professor Brown’s 
“alternative mechanism,” a company would have to go through two 
different court systems in Delaware:123 the Chancery Court,124 followed by 
an appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.125 However, under the power 
given to the SEC by the Delaware state legislature, litigants are directed 
straight to the Delaware Supreme Court.126 Thus, not only does the SEC’s 
certification power give a definitive, binding answer to all involved, but it 
also saves money for litigants by eliminating an additional round of court 
costs and attorney fees. In the case of corporate litigants (such as CA and 
AFSCME), every dollar saved by the parties is another dollar available for 
the corporation and shareholders. While the savings may be trivial for big 
corporate entities (again, like CA127 and AFSCME128
                                                                                                                 
proposals, like the one proposed by AFSCME, under Rule 14a-8(i)(8). However, the SEC never 
stated what its answer would be under 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) because such an answer is impossible 
to formulate in the ever-changing world of a state’s corporate law jurisprudence. Thus, the SEC’s 
decision is consistent. 
 121. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that federal 
corporate law violates an area traditionally governed by the states). 
 122. See id. 
 123. The number of courts that would have to be encountered under Professor Brown’s 
alternative method would vary from state to state. In Delaware, this type of claim would start in 
the Court of Chancery and then be appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. Thus, the jurisdiction 
of two courts would be invoked. 
 124. The Delaware Court of Chancery makes “determination[s] of disputes involving the 
internal affairs of the thousands upon thousands of Delaware corporations and other business 
entities through which a vast amount of the world’s commercial affairs is conducted.”  Delaware 
Court of Chancery Homepage, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/Court%20of%20Chancery/ (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
 125. “In civil cases, the Delaware Supreme Court has jurisdiction to accept appeals from final 
orders issued by the judges (not commissioners or masters) of the Court of Chancery.” Filing an 
Appeal in the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, 
http://courts.delaware.gov/How%20To/Appeals/?SupremeCitizensGuide.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 
2009). 
 126. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8). 
 127. CA, Inc. had a gross revenue of $4.277 Billion and a net profit of $500 Million in 2007. 
CA, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 27 (May 23, 2008). 
 128. The AFSCME Employee Pension Fund has been described as being worth a trillion 
dollars. Supreme Court Decides SEC-presented Delaware Bylaw Issue (July 17, 2008), 
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/articles/delaware-supreme-court-updates/. 
), such savings might 
prove significant if the litigants were a small start-up corporation and an 
individual, flesh-and-blood shareholder who made the proposal. 
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Another advantage of the SEC’s power to certify is the ability of the 
Delaware courts to address corporate law questions faster and more 
efficiently.129 Allowing the SEC to certify questions of law to the Delaware 
Supreme Court gives the Delaware Supreme Court the ability to render an 
opinion on a subject over which it otherwise would have to wait to acquire 
jurisdiction.130 The “expedited process” allows for clarification of the laws 
and gives guidance to the lower Delaware courts, unifying their decisions. 
This unification factor is especially important for Delaware, whose 
corporate law jurisprudence is often relied upon by courts in different 
jurisdictions.131
Prior to being given the ability to certify questions of law to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, the SEC often deferred to the company’s legal 
opinion in no-action requests where the only opinion submitted was 
provided by the company.
 
132 When the SEC not only “receive[d] a well-
reasoned legal opinion from the company, but also receive[d] an equally 
well-reasoned legal opinion from [a] shareholder reaching the opposite 
conclusion” the SEC usually ruled that a proposal could not be excluded.133 
This is because “Rule 14a-8(g) places the burden . . . of demonstrating that 
exclusion is warranted” on the company.134 As a result, the Staff did not 
“previously . . . permit[] exclusion when there [were] dueling legal 
opinions.”135 Under this line of reasoning, it is fair to say that AFSCME’s 
proposal would not have been excluded under the SEC’s “old” method of 
Rule 14a-8 interpretation and decision making.136
                                                                                                                 
 129. This observation is made simply from common knowledge. The Delaware Supreme Court 
took sixteen days to decide CA, Inc., from certification by the SEC. If the parties had to go 
through the entire Delaware court structure, from the Court of Chancery through the Delaware 
Supreme Court, it would take longer than sixteen days. 
 130. Like other similar courts, the Delaware Supreme Court is not allowed to give unsolicited, 
“advisory opinions.” See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8). Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court (or any 
other court in Delaware) would have to wait for a party to bring an action in order to rule on it. 
 131. One reason so many courts decide to follow Delaware Corporate Law jurisprudence is due 
to the internal affairs doctrine. See Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Venue and 
Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2009). The internal affairs doctrine 
states that a company’s choice state of incorporation “effectuates a choice of corporate law that is 
binding on the corporation and its directors, officers and controlling shareholders. Because of the 
internal affairs doctrine, even when Delaware corporations or their managers become defendants 
in out-of-state corporate lawsuits, Delaware’s corporate law will govern.” Id. Consequently, since 
most publicly traded corporations are housed in Delaware, Delaware’s jurisprudence is very 
significant. See Delaware Dept. of State: Div. of Corp., 
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
 132. See Atkins, supra note 4. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. In fact, Delaware is currently the only State to allow the SEC to certify questions of law to 
any of its courts. The “old” method would be the one used by the Staff to decide Rule 14a-8 no-
action requests made by companies whose state of incorporation is not Delaware. 
 Thus, the benefit of the 
certification power has already been demonstrated, as the SEC under the old 
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method of analysis would have come to the wrong conclusion in the CA, 
Inc. no-action request. 
Finally, from a policy perspective, other states should give the SEC the 
ability to certify questions of state law to their respective courts in order to 
give a proper answer under the federal securities laws. Currently, the SEC 
is charged with interpreting state law when making a decision under Rules 
14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2). However, with the exception of Delaware, no state 
allows its courts to hear cases directly from the SEC.137 Consequently, 
when the SEC is confronted with a novel question of state law (such as with 
the CA, Inc. no-action request) the SEC’s ability to provide the correct 
answer is severely limited—it must interpret a state’s law even though it is 
not an expert in that state’s law.138 Such a decision is difficult for any type 
of federal institution, whether it be a court or agency.139 Thus, other states 
should follow Delaware’s lead and allow the SEC to certify questions of 
law that arise under federal securities law.140
VI. THE AFTERSHOCK OF CA, INC. V. AFSCME: THE STATUS 
OF SHAREHOLDER-ADOPTED BYLAWS AFFECTING 
CORPORATIONS UNDER DELAWARE LAW 
 By doing so, clear, quick and 
accurate guidance will be given not only to the SEC, but also to companies 
and shareholders alike as to what is permissible under the law of their state 
of incorporation. If a state is truly concerned with its corporate law, then 
there is no reason for that state to allow the SEC to interpret its corporate 
law. 
Although the CA, Inc. case raises questions of federalism, it is also a 
landmark case in Delaware corporate law jurisprudence.141 Although the 
decision has scholars and commentators debating what exactly the 
Delaware Supreme Court decided, ultimately the decision will prove to be a 
victory in name only for shareholders who propose an election-related 
bylaw amendment; for all other bylaws, the CA, Inc. decision is a 
significant defeat.142
                                                                                                                 
 137. See Atkins, supra note 4 (stating that the power to certify questions of law to Delaware 
was a “new method” of deciding Rule 14a-8 issues). 
 138. See id. (stating that part of the SEC’s job under Rule 14a-8 is to “resolve issue[s] of state 
law”). 
 139. See Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 580 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J., 
concurring) (stating that the task of a federal court to apply state law is difficult when the 
jurisprudence on the subject is undeveloped). In reality, a federal agency trying to do the same 
thing is just as difficult. 
 140. A state should not necessarily accept certification from the SEC. If state courts are content 
with having the SEC interpret its laws without more explicit guidance, that is their prerogative. 
 141. CA v. AFSCME: The Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh 
Away, supra note 42. 
 142. See id. (stating that the CA, Inc. case “is a very significant decision that will prompt much 
practitioner commentary and scholarly discussion . . . with implications that will take time and 
future decisions to work out”). 
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A. THE COURT’S OPINION 
In order to arrive at a decision, the court had to answer two 
questions:143 First, was “the AFSCME proposal144 a proper subject for 
action by shareholders as a matter of Delaware law,”145 and second, “would 
the AFSCME Proposal . . . cause CA to violate any Delaware law”?146 
Regarding the first question, the court stated that the board of directors and 
shareholders each have the power to “adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.”147 
However, the court concluded that the shareholders’ power to adopt, amend 
or repeal bylaws is separate from management’s and “not coextensive with 
the board’s concurrent power and is limited by the board’s management 
prerogatives under [s]ection 141(a).”148 Consequently, the court declared 
that if the proposal was legal it must be in “the scope or reach of 
shareholders’ power to adopt, alter or repeal bylaws.”149 In order to 
determine shareholders’ power under DGCL section 109(b) versus 
management’s power under section 141(a), the court had to decide “what is 
the scope of shareholder action that [s]ection 109(b) permits yet does not 
improperly intrude upon the directors’ power to manage corporation’s 
business and affairs under [s]ection 141(a).”150
Relying on precedent,
 
151 the Delaware Supreme Court declared that 
“procedural bylaws do not improperly encroach upon the board’s 
managerial authority under [s]ection 141(a).”152 Since the proposal’s call 
for mandatory reimbursement would “encourage the nomination of non-
management board candidates by promising reimbursement of . . . proxy 
expenses if one or more candidates [were] elected”153 and because “[t]he 
unadorned right to cast a ballot in a contest for [corporate] office . . . is 
meaningless without the right to participate in selecting the contestants,”154
                                                                                                                 
 143. CA, Inc. v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 
231 (Del. 2008). 
 144. For purposes of this section, the words “Proposal” and “Bylaw” (when capitalized) are 
used interchangeably to refer to AFSCME’s proposal. 
 145. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 232. The court stated that shareholders find their power from § 109(a), while 
management finds its power from §141(a). See id. Furthermore, § 109(b) articulates the grant of 
power given by §109(a). Consequently, the court’s analysis (and mine) will often refer to § 
109(b). See id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 234. 
 151. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 235 nn.15–16. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 237. 
 154. Id. (alteration in the original) (citing Harrah’s Entm’t v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 
311 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
 
the proposal at issue had the “purpose of . . . promot[ing] the integrity of the 
[director] electoral process by facilitating the nomination of director 
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candidates by stockholders or groups of stockholders.”155 The court 
concluded that the proposal’s “substantive-sounding mandate to expend 
corporate funds, has both the intent and effect of regulating the process for 
electing directors of CA.”156 Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court determined 
that the bylaw was a “proper subject for shareholder action,” answering the 
first question certified to them in the affirmative.157
Next, the court had to address whether the bylaw was “inconsistent with 
law,”
 
158 specifically, “whether the proposed bylaw, if adopted, would cause 
CA to violate any Delaware law to which it is subject.”159 Looking at the 
proposal abstractly to see if there was at least one hypothetical situation 
where the proposal would cause the CA board of directors to violate their 
fiduciary duties to the corporation,160 and relying on two prior Delaware 
Supreme Court decisions,161 the court concluded the bylaw, if adopted, 
would prevent the CA board of directors from “fully discharging their 
fiduciary duties to the corporation and shareholders.”162 Therefore, the court 
concluded that proposal was illegal.163
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., the first 
case relied on, a no-shop provision
 
164 for a proposed merger was held to be 
“invalid and unenforceable” because it was tantamount to having the board 
of directors of the target company165 contract away their fiduciary duties.166 
Similarly, in Quickturn Designs Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, the second case relied 
on, a “delayed redemption poison pill”167 was held to be invalid because it 
would “deprive a newly elected board of both its statutory authority to 
manage the corporation under [section 141(a)] and its concomitant fiduciary 
duty pursuant to that mandate.”168
                                                                                                                 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 236 (emphasis added). 
 157. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 238. 
 161. The two cases the court relied upon are Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC 
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994), and Quickturn Designs Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 
1281 (Del. 1998). Both cases are discussed infra. 
 162. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238. 
 163. Id. at 240. 
 164. A no-shop provision prevents a “target company . . . from communicating with competing 
bidders in an effort to obtain the highest available value for shareholders.”  Id. at 238. 
 165. A target company is the company being acquired in a merger. See id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. A delayed redemption poison pill prevents a “newly elected board of directors from 
redeeming a poison pill” for a certain period of time in hopes of deterring a hostile bidder from 
waging a proxy contest. Id. at 238–39. 
 168. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238–39. 
 Thus, in each case the court invalidated 
“binding contractual arrangements that the board of directors had 
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voluntarily imposed upon themselves” because of the interference it would 
impose on the board’s fiduciary duties.169
Applying a QVC/Quickturn analysis, the court concluded the proposal, 
as written, was illegal because although the bylaw allowed the CA board to 
“determine what amount to reimburse,” it contained “no language or 
provision that would reserve to CA’s directors their full power to exercise 
their fiduciary duty to decide whether or not it would be appropriate, in a 
specific case, to award reimbursement at all.”
 
170 Since Delaware law forbids 
a “board from reimbursing costs incurred where a proxy contest is 
motivated by personal or petty concerns, or to promote interests that do not 
further, or are adverse to those of the corporation,”171 CA would violate its 
fiduciary duties if the bylaw was adopted.172 Even if shareholders were the 
ones making the binding resolution, and not the board of directors like in 
QVC and Quickturn, it would be a “distinction without a difference”173 
since the Bylaw would prevent the board of directors from discharging their 
fiduciary duties properly.174 Consequently, the second question was 
answered in the affirmative.175
Scholars and commentators immediately took note of the CA, Inc. 
decision, and started to debate what the case actually meant for the future of 
Delaware corporate law.
 
176 Furthermore, although the court said the 
election-related bylaw was permissible as an exercise of shareholders’ 
power under section 109, it was not attempting to draw a “bright line” rule 
of when something promulgated under section 109 intrudes upon 
management’s power in section 141.177
B. COMMENTATORS AND SCHOLARS REACT 
 
The CA, Inc. decision has divided commentators and scholars over what 
it actually means. According to Lisa Fairfax,178 while a bylaw that 
contained a fiduciary out clause would “do away with any concern that the 
implementation of the bylaw would violate Delaware law in the form of 
compelling directors to act in a manner that violates their [fiduciary 
duties],”179
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. at 239. 
 170. Id. at 240. 
 171. Id. This is the hypothetical situation alluded to by the Delaware Supreme Court in CA, Inc. 
 172. See id. at 240. 
 173. Id. at 239. 
 174. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 239. 
 175. Id. at 240. 
 176. See sources cited supra note 42. 
 177. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 234 n.14. 
 178. Lisa Fairfax, Professor of Law, Univ. of Maryland Sch. of Law, 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/profiles/faculty.html?facultynum=044.  
 179. What’s Next for Shareholder Advocates? (July 21, 2008), 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/07/page/4/. 
 even if such bylaw were valid, directors could now challenge it 
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by “allowing directors to challenge payment of expenses for every 
successful candidate.”180 Since “the potential for protracted litigation over 
such questions . . . makes reimbursement uncertain,”181 it is possible that 
[the] “bylaw’s purpose of facilitating more nominees [is undermined].”182 
Professor Brown echoes Ms. Fairfax’s views, adding that while there was 
“no language in the bylaw [pertaining to a fiduciary out clause,] there didn’t 
have to be [because] [u]nder Delaware law, a board confronted with the 
possibility of an illegal payment could have undone the bylaw in its 
entirety. In other words, the fiduciary out was in the statute.”183
However, not all commentators look at the CA, Inc. opinion so bleakly. 
J.W. Verret
 
184 argues that this decision is “a measured victory for 
shareholder activist[s] . . . [because] [t]here is a good chance that a Board’s 
decision to withhold reimbursement through claims that its fiduciary duty 
requires it would be subject to heightened review . . . since the [c]ourt has 
accepted that this bylaw is intimately connected with the election 
process.”185 Larry Ribstein186 answers those who believe the CA, Inc. 
decision is a severe blow to shareholder activism by asserting the court will 
not “use its power to negate shareholder rights . . . . The [c]ourt made it 
clear that it was not deciding the issue as a matter of policy . . . . Thus, the 
[c]ourt was careful to present itself as a pragmatic forum that would hear 
shareholders’ arguments on a case by case basis.”187 Similarly, another 
commentator argues that “the case [is] . . . a significant win . . . [because] 
the [c]ourt held that the election process was a proper subject for 
stockholder action. A bylaw mandating the inclusion of stockholder 
nominees on the company’s proxy statement should fare much better under 
a CA, Inc. analysis.”188
Outside of election-related bylaws, commentators and scholars 
generally feel that the CA, Inc. opinion leaves little room for shareholders to 
affect a corporation via the bylaw amendment process because of the 
 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access (The Actual Result) 
(Part 19), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/the-sec-governance/as-predicted-the-sec-and-the-
further-denial-of-shareholder-a-46064.html (July 18, 2008, 9:00 AM). 
 184. See J.W. Verret, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, 
http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/verret_jw. 
 185. ProfessorBainbridge.com, Commentary on CA v AFSCME, 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/ (July 18, 2008) (follow “Archive (Calendar) hyperlink; then 
follow “Previous Year” hyperlink; then follow “July” hyperlink; then follow “Commentary on CA 
v AFSCME” hyperlink). Furthermore, Professor Stephen Bainbridge agrees with this view. See id. 
(stating that [such] views are “probably right”). 
 186. See Larry Ribstein, Professor of Law at the Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 
http://www.law.uiuc.edu/faculty-admin/directory/LarryRibstein. 
 187. Ribstein, Delaware Responds, supra note 42. 
 188. CA v. AFSCME: The Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh 
Away, supra note 42. 
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QVC/Quickturn analysis that the court used. Professor Brown asserts that, 
due to the CA, Inc. opinion, “[b]ylaws requiring boards to undertake steps 
to curb global warming, . . . or to withdraw poison pills . . . [will] be on 
their face invalid [since they are not procedural] . . . . The [c]ourt used the 
case to dramatically broaden the types of bylaws that now must be excluded 
under Rule 14a-8.”189 This viewpoint is also asserted by another 
commentator who says, “[o]utside the election process, the case is generally 
negative for stockholder-adopted bylaws. For example, the strong 
QVC/Quickturn analysis should doom any substantive component to a pill 
redemption bylaw, such as a requirement that directors not adopt or renew 
any pill that could be in place longer than a year.”190 However, some 
commentators posit that the future implications of the CA, Inc. case are 
unknown191 because the “court deliberately leaves us with little clarity and 
certainty as to how to discern whether a given bylaw is one that is process-
related [and thus valid] . . . or is one that by mandating the decision is 
necessarily substantive and, therefore, would be invasive of the managerial 
prerogatives of the board.”192
C. THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF CA, INC. V. AFSCME 
 Therefore, the views of the CA, Inc. opinion 
amongst experts in the corporate law and governance field are divided at 
best. 
The effects of the CA, Inc. case can be analyzed as in two distinct 
categories: bylaws that affect election-related processes, and bylaws that 
affect the board of directors’ substantive decision making process. 
Concerning the first category, the CA, Inc. case is a victory in name only. 
While it is true that a bylaw similar to the one AFSCME proposed (that 
contains a fiduciary-out clause) is now valid, the board of directors have the 
power to object to corporate expenses.193
                                                                                                                 
 189. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access (The Actual Result) 
(Part 18), supra note 183. 
 190. CA v. AFSCME: The Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh 
Away, supra note 42. 
 191. See Genkin & Gottfried, supra note 42 (stating that the court avoided “articulating with 
‘doctrinaire exactitude’ a bright line that divides those bylaws that shareholders may unilaterally 
adopt from those which they may not since they would encroach upon the board’s power and 
authority to manage the business and affairs of the company”). See also CA v. AFSCME: The 
Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away, supra note 42 (stating that 
in the “unforeseen consequences department, directors may find that the CA decision’s broad 
extension of a fiduciary trump card causes more problems than it solves. Under the CA analysis, 
mandatory bylaws may no longer be mandatory. They rather appear to be subject to the directors’ 
overarching fiduciary duties. Directors who take action in reliance on a mandatory bylaw 
therefore can now be second-guessed on fiduciary duty grounds.”). 
 192. See Genkin & Gottfried, supra note 42. 
 193. See CA, Inc. v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 
227, 240 (Del. 2008). 
 The mandatory reimbursement 
feature for a short slate of directors made this bylaw unique. However, a 
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fiduciary-out clause makes the mandatory reimbursement provision useless. 
The fear of protracted litigation that Ms. Fairfax expresses is a very real 
situation that is quite likely to occur. Fear that proxy expenses will not be 
reimbursed will act as a deterrent towards those who have an inclination to 
nominate their own short slate of directors. 
Although the court’s broad interpretation of the AFSCME bylaw as a 
process-oriented bylaw is a victory for shareholders, it will be a victory 
with no consequences unless the Delaware courts (or legislature) either (i) 
expressly excepts a short slate’s mandatory reimbursement of proxy 
expenses from fiduciary duties or (ii) allow shareholders to be compensated 
or significantly penalizes corporations for bringing fiduciary-out lawsuits 
that do not win. Without such deterrents, corporations have little, if any 
reason not to challenge a reimbursement of proxy expenses from corporate 
funds in a short-slate proxy contest. 
Outside of the election-related bylaw amendments, the CA, Inc. 
decision is a significant defeat for shareholders who wish to impinge upon 
power generally reserved to the board of directors, such as the right to 
redeem poison pills or to determine where the board invests the 
corporations’ money. By using the QVC/Quickturn analysis, the court 
reaffirmed that only a corporations’ board of directors has the power to 
decide how “specific substantive business decisions” are made.194 On a 
certain level, such a decision makes sense because the corporation is run by 
professional managers (i.e. the board of directors). Consequently, why 
should their determinations be questioned by passive investors 
(shareholders)?195
Although Professor Brown believes the Commission was wrong for 
certifying the questions it did to the Delaware Supreme Court, he believes 
“the Delaware Supreme Court[’s] . . . reasoning . . . will allow companies to 
challenge even more proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8. [This] will, 
ultimately, put pressure on the Commission to sidestep the anti-shareholder 
nature of Delaware law and allow access to the company’s proxy 
statement,” a result which is the goal of every shareholder activist.
 
196 While 
such a proposition is intriguing, and if it came to fruition, would make the 
CA, Inc. opinion “largely irrelevant,”197
                                                                                                                 
 194. Id. at 235. 
 195. See generally ProfessorBainbridge.com, CA v. AFSCME: The Limits of Shareholder 
Power (July 17, 2008), (follow “Archive (Calendar) hyperlink; then follow “Previous Year” 
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(Part 21), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/the-sec-governance/as-predicted-the-sec-and-the-
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 it is not the state of Delaware 
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corporate law as we know it today. Furthermore, while the Delaware 
Supreme Court did not announce with “doctrinal exactitude” the scope of 
section 109’s power versus section 141, such language should be viewed as 
a defensive measure taken by the court to protect itself, rather than as 
language to support optimistic shareholder activists.198
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Therefore, the 
impact of shareholders to intrude upon the power of management, at least in 
the near future, will be minimal at best. 
The CA, Inc. case raises interesting questions of federalism and the 
limits of shareholder activism. Regarding the issue of federalism, the SEC 
was correct to certify the questions to Delaware because corporate law is 
not an issue for the federal government to decide. Corporate law is a state 
issue, and thus, when a method exists for the federal government to decide 
an issue about a certain aspect of corporate law with certainty, it must. 
With respect to the substantive decision behind the CA, Inc. case, the 
opinion can be seen as a victory in name only with respect to election-
related bylaws and a complete defeat in all other areas. The Delaware 
Supreme Court was clear that the ultimate authority to make decisions 
remains with the board, and while the court did say that a proposal like 
AFSCME’s would be valid if it contained a fiduciary-out clause, it is that 
requirement that will probably scare away activists from trying to wage a 
proxy war when a short slate of candidates is involved. As a result, the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s CA, Inc. decision reaffirmed many people’s 
view of it as a “director-centric” court.199
Joseph Antignani
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